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Abstract
This paper offers a comprehensive comparison of the structure of banking and financial markets
in the euro area. Based on this, several hypotheses about the role of banks in monetary policy
transmission are developed. Many of the predictions that have been proposed for the U.S. are
deemed unlikely to apply in Europe. Testing these hypotheses we find that monetary policy does
alter bank loan supply, with the effects most dependent on the liquidity of individual banks.
Unlike in the US, the size of a bank does generally not explain its lending reaction. We also show
that the standard publicly available database, BankScope, obscures the heterogeneity across
banks. Indeed, for several types of questions BankScope data suggest very different answers than
more complete data that reside at national central banks.
JEL classification: C23, E44, E52, G21
Keywords: monetary policy transmission, financial structure, bank lending
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1. Introduction
On January 1st, 1999, eleven European countries fixed the exchange rates of their national currencies
irrevocably and started monetary union with the conduct of a single monetary policy under the
responsibility of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank.1 This creation of a single
currency for several countries raises the need to better understand the transmission process of
monetary policy in the new currency area. While theory offers a wide array of different transmission
channels (e.g., the exchange rate, asset price or interest rate channels,...), those that offer an important
role for banks are of special interest here, mainly for two reasons.
First, most European countries rely much more heavily on bank finance than for example the US (see
table 1). Comparing the ratio of bank total assets to GDP across the four largest countries of the euro
area2 and the US it turns out that banks are much less important in the US than in any of the
European countries. Accordingly, the financial structure of the corporate sector in Europe relies
much more heavily on bank loans, with the mirror image of this being the larger stock market
capitalisation and the more prominent role of debt securities issued by the corporate sector in the US.
Table 1: Financial structures in the euro area and the US (% of GDP), 1999
Euro area France Germany Italy Spain US
Bank total assets 1 181 180 195 122 144 99
Bank loans to corporate sector 1 45.2 37.2 39.8 49.8 43.1 12.6
Debt securities issued by
corporate sector 2 3.6 7.6 0.7 1.0 4.4 25.7
Stock market capitalisation 3 90 111 72 66 77 193
Source: 1 Eurosystem 2 BIS 3 International Federation of Stock Exchanges
Second, around the high overall level of bank dependence there are also some notable country-level
differences. Thus, it is also natural to explore the implications of these differences. We document the
differences in a comprehensive fashion in tables 2 and 3, and in what follows concentrate on the gaps
that may have implications for the transmission of monetary policy.
For instance, we will show that firms depend to a different degree on bank finance in the various
countries. Italian firms, for instance, use around ten times less debt finance than firms in France.
Also, the maturity of bank loans is much shorter in Italy than in France. Such a shorter maturity
structure of bank loans is likely to accelerate the monetary transmission, since loans have to be
renewed much more frequently.
                                                                
1 On January 1st, 2001, Greece joined the monetary union as the twelfth member state.
2 These four countries, which form the group of countries studied in section 5, contribute approximately 80% to euro area
GDP.
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Another example is heterogeneity of the market structure of the banking industry across euro area
countries. The national market concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index is much lower in
Germany than for example in France. On the other hand, in both countries the five largest banks
show a similar market share. Germany is therefore characterised by a banking system with many
more very small banks, a large proportion of which is affiliated to a network. These differences in the
national market structure can potentially alter the transmission of monetary policy impulses.
We try to quantify the importance of these considerations by focusing on three questions: (1) what is
the role of banks (i.e. bank loans) in monetary transmission in the euro area, (2) are there differences
in this respect across the member countries of EMU, and (3) are there distributional effects of
monetary policy on different types of banks?
These issues have also been addressed in several recent studies on the monetary transmission process
at the aggregate level.3 However, the macroeconomic evidence is not conclusive, mainly because of
the wide confidence intervals that are normally associated with those estimates. This paper makes use
of microdata on banks. By using the cross-sectional information of these datasets, we hope to get
more precise estimates, thus allowing for better inference on differences across countries. Read in
conjunction with several companion papers analysing the country-level, this makes for a very
complete analysis of the role of banks in monetary policy transmission in the euro area.
The central task in this effort is to identify the reaction of loan supply to monetary policy actions.
This is important since bank loans are the most important link between banks and private non-banks,
and because bank loans very often cannot be easily substituted by other forms of finance on the
borrower’s side. For the analysis of bank loan supply, cross-sectional differences between banks can
aid in the identification problem. 4
In particular, we investigate whether there are certain types of banks whose lending is more
responsive to monetary policy impulses. This would be the case if a monetary policy induced
decrease in deposits (or increase in the cost of funding) were differentially hard for banks to
neutralise. If the banks face different funding costs, the same impulse will lead to different reductions
in lending across banks.
The prior literature has proceeded by positing several differences that could shape loan supply
sensitivity to monetary policy. One strand of this literature checks whether poorly capitalised banks
                                                                
3 E.g., Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2001); Clements et al (2001); Mihov (2001); Sala (2001). For a model which explicitly takes
into account the effect of differences in the bank lending channel on monetary policy see Gambacorta (2001a).
4 This identification strategy has been used extensively in the literature on the bank lending channel. It attributes banks an
active role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, arguing that banks reduce their loan supply following a
monetary contraction. If bank loans are not perfectly substitutable by other forms of finance by borrowers, then this
reduction in loan supply leads to real effects (given a certain degree of price rigidity). See, amongst others, Kashyap and
Stein (1995, 1997).
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have a more limited access to nondeposit financing and as such should be forced to reduce their loan
supply by more than well capitalised banks do (e.g., Peek and Rosengren, 1995). The role of size has
been emphasised, for example, in Kashyap and Stein (1995): small banks are assumed to suffer from
informational asymmetry problems more than large banks do, and find it therefore more difficult to
raise uninsured funds in times of monetary tightening. Again, this should force them to reduce their
bank lending relatively more when compared to large banks. Another distinction is often drawn
between more and less liquid banks (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 2000). Whereas relatively liquid banks
can draw down their liquid assets to shield their loan portfolio, this is not feasible for less liquid
banks.5
In section 2 we will provide a description of the financial markets in the countries of the euro area.
We will argue that these characteristics are important for the role of banks in monetary policy
transmission, and that some of the results found for the US are not likely to be applicable in the
European context. Mainly, we believe that the size criterion is not necessarily a good indicator for
distributional effects across banks. These presumptions will be tested in the empirical analysis, where
we consider which bank characteristics, i.e. size, liquidity or capitalisation distinguish banks’
responses to changes in the interest rates also in Europe. In this paper, we will perform regressions
for the euro area as a whole and the four largest countries of the euro area, and furthermore draw on
the results obtained in the companion papers. Whereas the companion papers are written with a
national perspective, the main aim of this paper is to provide an overview of those results obtained at
the national level, to produce a more comparable set of results by performing regressions in a
harmonised approach, and to broaden the focus to the euro area as a whole.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the banking
sector in the euro area and the consequences it might have for the role of banks in monetary policy
transmission. The theoretical model underlying our analysis is introduced in Section 3. Section 4
presents results for the entire euro area and the four largest member countries using individual bank
balance sheet data provided by BankScope, which have been used extensively in the literature, in
order to assess their quality for this type of analysis. Section 5 presents evidence on a national basis
using databases on the full population of banks collected by the respective national central banks.
Section 6 provides some measures of the macroeconomic importance of the results obtained. Section
7 summarises the main conclusions.
                                                                
5 Stein (1998); Ashcraft (2001); Kishan and Opiela (2000); Van den Heuvel (2001).
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2. The structure of the banking system in the euro area and its implications for the
role of banks in monetary policy transmission
2.1 The structure of the banking system in the euro area
This section provides a short description of the structure of the banking system in the euro area. As a
background, table 2 reports a number of statistics on the banking market in the individual euro area
countries. It covers indicators for the availability of non-bank finance for firms, measures of
concentration of the banking market, statistics on the performance of banks as well as an index of the
role of the government in banking. The table shows that bank finance, as stated in the introduction, is
of primary importance in most countries of the euro area, and gives some indication as to the
heterogeneity of banking structures.
We believe several features of national banking structures to be important for the response of bank
lending to a monetary policy action, and for the assessment of the macroeconomic importance of
such responses. In the following, we highlight the most distinctive patterns that might be relevant in
this context and refer the interested reader to the companion papers, which elaborate in more detail
on the main features of the respective national banking systems.
Importance of banks for firms’ financing
As mentioned in the preceding section, banks play an important role in firms’ financing. Market
financing of the corporate sector is less developed than in the US. Even in France, where it is more
important than in many countries of the euro area (see table 1), only the largest firms can issue debt
securities, and the role of banks in financing firms is still much more dominant than in the US. To
give another example, in Germany and Italy in 1997, the ratio of bonds to total bank loans of firms
stood at around 1 percent only. The business sector has therefore been heavily dependent on bank
credit, while the smaller size of the capital market has limited diversification of bank assets. This
indicates that changes in bank loan supply affect firms relatively strongly, since they cannot easily
find substitutes for the bank finance.
Maturity of loans, collateralisation
The loans supplied by Italian banks are to a large extent short-term and come with variable interest
rates. The same tendency is present in Spain. This can accelerate the transmission of monetary policy
impulses to lending rates and thus borrowing costs. On the other hand, countries like Austria and the
Netherlands have a longer maturity of loans and a higher share of fixed rate contracts.6 In countries
                                                                
6 Borio (1996).
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like Italy, where a high percentage of loans is backed by collateral, the response of bank loans to
monetary policy could be furthermore accentuated through the so called “balance sheet channel”.7
Relationship lending
In several European countries, the market for intermediated finance is characterised by relationship
rather than arm’s length lending. It is very common that bank customers establish long lasting
relationships with banks, with a prominent example being the German system of “house banks”, in
which firms conduct most of their financial business with one bank only. 8 With most German banks
operating as universal banks, and therefore supplying their customers with the full range of financial
services, this implies a much closer linkage to a single bank than in many other countries. For the
creditor, this could also imply an implicit guarantee to have access to (additional) funds even if the
central bank follows a restrictive monetary policy.9 In such a case, the reaction of bank loan supply to
monetary policy should be at least muted. Typically, house bank relationships exist between
relatively small banks – for which the loan business with non-banks is still a central activity – and
their customers. Italy shows a similar pattern, where many small banks entertain close relationships
with their customers, which are especially small firms.10 This is true for France as well, where most
small firms have business relationships with one bank only. However, although being numerous,
these small firms do not account for a large share of GDP.
Market concentration and size structure
The banking markets in the countries of the euro area have been characterised by a steadily
increasing concentration during the 1990’s. It stands at different levels in the various countries,
however. According to the Herfindahl index, Germany and Italy are at the lower end of market
concentration in the euro area, as opposed to Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, and especially
Finland.
Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix provide a more detailed comparison of the size structure in the
four largest countries of the euro area. We split the population of banks into small and large banks
with respect to a relative national threshold (with respect to their size in comparison to the national
distribution – table A3), as well as according to an absolute criterion in terms of the value of their
total assets (table A4).
For all countries, a small number of large banks holds a major share in both the loan and deposit
market: the 75% smallest banks hold only around 8% to 15% of deposits, and account for around 5%
                                                                
7 See, among others, Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Mishkin (1995), Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) and Kashyap and Stein
(1997).
8 See, e.g., Elsas and Krahnen (1998).
9 See, e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1998).
10 Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri (1998).
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to 12% of loans, whereas the 5% largest banks hold around 52% to 71% of deposits and have a
market share of around 56% to 77% in loans. Table A3 reports similar data on the US as a
benchmark. Also there, the 75% smallest banks account for a small market share in terms of total
assets, loans and deposits, whereas the top 5% account for the lion’s share in each respect.
The comparison with respect to the absolute threshold in table A4 shows that, although there are
many more banks with assets larger than 10 billion euros in Germany than elsewhere, there are many
fewer large banks in relation to the overall banking population: 2% of the German banks are large in
an absolute sense compared to 7% of the French banks. The relatively atomistic structure of the
German banking sector can also be seen when comparing the loan market share of small banks across
the four economies. It stands at 19% for Germany, as opposed to 3% in France.11
The structure of these small banks varies considerably across countries. Whereas French, Italian and
Spanish small banks are on average very liquid, there does not seem to be a difference in this respect
in Germany. Similarly with capitalisation, where small banks are on average better capitalised in
France, Italy and Spain, whereas there is only a small difference in Germany.
On the euro area scale, German banks are the least capitalised. The low degree of capitalisation in
Germany is usually explained by the low riskiness of the asset structure of German banks in an
international comparison: on average, German banks hold more public bonds and other less risky
assets, like e.g. interbank assets. It is interesting to note that in Italy, the small banks hold a much
larger market share in the deposit market than in the loan market, which turns out to be less extreme
in the other countries.
                                                                
11 These discrepancies might also partly reflect differences in the way cooperative bank networks are considered in each
country. In France, these networks have been, except for one of them, considered as a unique entity, rather than a multitude
of banks. Nevertheless, those networks are globally less important in France than in Germany.
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Table 2: Banking structure of the euro area countries pre EMU, 1997
AT BE FI FR DE GR IE IT LU NL PT ES
Availability of non-bank finance
Domestic debt securities issued by corporates
        As a % of GDP
        As a  % of bank loans to corporate sector
1.9
3.0
6.5
15.7
4.6
7.2
5.1
13.8
0.4
1.0
..
..
4.8
..
0.5
1.1
..
..
3.8
6.7
8.8
22.4
2.8
7.4
Stock market capitalisation (% of GDP) 18.5 58.2 63.5 49.5 39.9 29.6 59.1 30.6 186.2 132.1 40.9 56.2
% of net incurred liabilities of non-fin. corp.
corresponding to securities issu. (avge. 95-99) 42.2 54.9 59.6 53.9 20.9 .. .. 25.2 .. 27.1 .. 17.8
Market Concentration
Market share of large banks (total assets = 6
billion euros) 60.5 91.0 66.0 .. 71.7 68.7 49.9 75.0 61.7 .. 83.9 73.0
Population share of large banks (total assets
= 6 billion euros) 3.0 16.4 0.9 .. 3.1 12.5 10.4 6.0 12.1 .. 16.4 6.6
No of institutions per mio inhabitants 123 13 68 22 42 5 19 16 498 11 4 8
Herfindahl index*1000 75 106 337 45 19 110 126 29 29 192 94 40
Market share of five largest banks 45.3 57.0 78.8 32.6 31.5 57.3 35.9 30.1 22.4 24.7 48.6 38.0
Bank Performance
ROE: profit after tax/capital and reserves
(avge. 91-97, %) 7.0 7.9 -15.1 2.9 5.8 16.51 14.22 2.8 11.81 11.1 6.61 6.9
Provisions/gross income (avge.91-97,%) 18.3 13.9 -0.6 22.2 15.4 10.71 3.72 19.1 16.71 7.9 17.11 17.3
Operating expens./gross inc.(avge.91-97,%) 66.5 67.9 123.5 68.1 63.5 61.51 58.42 66.5 42.81 67.5 60.21 60.7
No of employees per mio inhabitants 8798 7550 4998 6779 8749 5505 12022 6029 47176 7718 6086 6159
State influence
% of assets of top 10 banks owned or
controlled by the government, 1995 50.4 27.6 30.7 17.3 36.4 70.0 4.5 36.0 5.1 9.2 25.7 2.0
Sources: National financial accounts (net incurred liabilities). International federation of stock exchanges (stock market capitalisation). Corvoisier and Gropp (2001; Herfindahl index and top five
market share). OECD (profit, operating expenses, provisions). LaPorta et al. (2000; State influence). Eurosystem data otherwise
1 Commercial banks only.
2 Average 1995-97.
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Table 3: The structure of national financial systems
AT BE FI FR DE GR IE IT LU NL PT ES
Importance of banks for
firms’ financing1
Very
important
Important Important Important Very
important
Very
important
Important Very
important
Important Important Important Very
important
Fraction of short-term
loans2
Average Average Low Low Low High Low High N.A. Low Low High
Fraction of loans at
variable interest rates3
Low High High Average Low High High High N.A. Low High High
Relationship lending Very
important
(house
banks)
Not very
important
(many
SMEs,
family-
owned, less
proned to
traditional
relationship
lending)
Important,
but declining
Not
important
except for
small firms
Very
important
(house
banks)
Not
important
any more
Very
important for
commercial
lending
Very
important
N.A. Important Not
important
(firms often
initially
borrow from
a single
bank, but
then switch
to borrowing
from several
banks7)
Not
important
Market concentration4 Medium High High Medium Low High High Low Low High High Medium
State influence5 Strong
(public
guarantees
for most
savings
banks)
Medium Strong
(blanket
public
guarantee in
the aftermath
of the
banking
crisis)
Medium Strong
(public
guarantees in
the savings
banks’
sector)
Strong Weak Strong
but
declining
Weak Weak Medium Weak (no
public
guarantees of
savings
banks)
Deposit insurance6 Average
(approx.
15,000 euros
in 1990,
20,000 in
1998)
Average
(approx.
12,500 euros
per depositor
until 1998,
15,000 in
1999, 20,000
euros since)
High
initially,
average now
(practically
complete in
1990,
approx.
25,000 euros
in 1998)
High (76,000
euros since
1999; at a
similar level,
but not
unified
across banks
before)
Practically
complete
Average
(20,000
euros,
complete for
deposits with
the Postal
Savings
bank)
Average
(20,000
euros)
High
(103,000
euros; until
1996 also
75%
coverage
between
103,000 and
516,000
euros)
Modest Average
(approx.
18,000 euros
in 1990,
20,000 since
1995)
Average
(15,000
euros fully
insured,
second
15,000 euros
75%, third
15,000 euros
50%)
Modest
(9,000 euros
per depositor
in 1990,
15,000 euros
in 1998,
20,000 euros
now)
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Table 3 (ctd): The structure of national financial systems
AT BE FI FR DE GR IE IT LU NL PT ES
Bank networks of
independent banks
Very
important
(most banks
are in a
network,
with very
strong links
to the head
institution)
Not
important
(Credit
Agricole
consists of
two member
banks, Credit
Professionne
l has weak
links)
Very
important
(the vast
majority of
banks is
organised in
groups with
very close
ties between
banks)
Important Very
important
(most banks
are in a
network,
with very
strong links
to the head
institution)
Not
important
(no
networks)
Very
important
(for retail
banks)
Very
important
(most banks
are in a
network,
with links to
the head
institution)
Not
important
(network of
mutual
agricultural
credit banks
supplies data
on the
aggregate
level)
Not
important
(bank groups
like, e.g.,
ABN Amro,
Rabo or ING
have
consolidated
balance
sheets, and
can thus be
regarded as
one bank)
Not
important
(network of
mutual
agricultural
credit banks
supplies data
on the
aggregate
level)
Not
important
(they exist
but weak
links
between
member
banks and
head
institution)
1 See table 2. Countries ranked “very important” are those that comply with all of the following four conditions: debt securities to GDP <4%, debt securities to bank loans <10%, stock market
capitalisation to GDP <60% and funds raised through securities issuance <50%. Countries that fail to comply with at least one of those conditions are ranked “important”. No country was ranked
as “less important”, which would apply for example for the US with debt to GDP at 26%, debt to bank loans higher than 100% and stock market capitalisation at 193% of GDP (see table 1).
2 Source: Borio, 1996. “low”: fraction of short term loans <20%; “high”: >35%
3 Source: Borio, 1996. “low”: fraction of loans at variable interest rates <40%; “high”: >50%. Source in case of Germany: Bundesbank internal paper, based on survey data for 1997.
4 See table A1. Concentration is ranked low when Herfindahl index and the market share of the five largest banks are in the range of 30 or below. It is ranked high when the Herfindahl index
stands at around 100, and the market share of the five largest banks does not give conflicting evidence. It is ranked medium for intermediate cases.
5 Countries are ranked according to the percentage of the assets of the top 10 banks controlled by the government (see Table 2): “strong” (>30%), “medium” (between 10% and 30%) and “weak”
(<10%). This is checked to be consistent with other available information on public guarantees or ownership. The evaluation refers roughly to the first half of the 1990s. State influence declined
steadily during the sample period in almost all countries. Therefore, the present ranking is based on a rough average for the sample period considered in the estimates and does not necessarily
reflect the ranking at the end of the sample period.
6 Source: Eurosystem. “Average” for values around 20,000 euros.
7 See Farinha and Santos, 2000.
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State influence and ownership structure
Although steadily declining over time, the role of the government in banking markets is an important
issue in Europe.12 State influence has been much more common than in the US, as is documented in
LaPorta et al. (2000). State influence is exerted either through direct public ownership of banks,
through state control, or through public guarantees. Public ownership of banks was, during the
sample period studied, most widespread in Austria, but significant also in most other countries of the
euro area. In Finland, the government issued a guarantee for all bank deposits following the banking
crisis of the early 1990s, and maintained this until 1998. In Greece, the market share of the state-
controlled banks is currently around 50%, down from 70% in 1995. In other countries, the influence
of the state is rather limited, like for example in Spain, where state-owned banks represented 13% of
total loans and 3% of total deposits at the start of the sample period (1988), but have been completely
privatised by the end of the sample. Savings banks in Spain are not publicly guaranteed, despite the
involvement of some local governments in their control.
Deposit insurance
The degree of effective deposit insurance differs considerably across European countries during the
sample period studied. Deposit insurance in Spain covered all deposits of non-financial entities up to
a relatively modest amount (9000 euros per depositor in 1990 and 15000 euros in 1998). In Germany,
on the other hand, the statutory deposit insurance system, a private safety fund as well as cross-
guarantee arrangements in the savings banks’ and in the cooperative banks’ sectors, respectively,
effectively amount to a full insurance of all non-bank deposits. France appears to be in an
intermediate position with a complete insurance for deposits up to 76000 euros per depositor.
Bank failures
In most countries of the euro area, bank failures have been occurring much less frequently than in the
US.13 Around 1500 bank failures are reported for the US for the period 1980-1994. Even between
1994 and 2000, i.e. in an economic boom, there were 7 bank failures per year on average.14 This is a
considerably higher fraction of the banking population than for example in Germany, where only
around 50 private banks have failed since 1966. Also in Italy many fewer bank failures occurred.15 In
Spain, two banking crises occurred during the last 25 years. The first one (1978-1985) was more
                                                                
12 For example, in Italy the share of total asset held by banks and groups controlled by the State passed from 68 per cent in
1992 to 12 per cent in 2000.
13 A direct comparison of these numbers is complicated by the fact that the definition of bank failures might be different
across countries. Especially numbers on prevented bank failures are difficult to obtain for the euro area countries. Some
cases are listed in Gropp et al. (2001).
14 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1998) for 1980-1994, and www.fdic.gov.
15 In the period 1980-1997, 40 (in almost all cases very small mutual) banks were placed in administrative liquidation. The
share of deposits of failed banks was always negligible and reached around 1% only three times, namely in 1982, 1987 and
1996 (see Boccuzzi, 1998).
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widespread, affecting 58 banks (accounting for 27% of deposits), while the second one (1991-1993)
affected very few banks but involved one of the biggest institutions. In both cases, due to the
potential systemic implications, most of the banks were either acquired by other solvent institutions,
or the government intervened, so that depositors’ losses were very limited. Besides these two periods,
there was only one failure of a very small bank in Spain. A banking crisis was also experienced in
Finland during the early 1990s. However, because of strong government intervention, only one bank
failure materialised.
Bank networks
In several countries of the euro area, banks have set up networks of various kinds. Especially the
savings banks and credit cooperatives are frequently organised in networks, although with a varying
degree of collaboration in the different countries. To give an example, in Germany most banks (and
especially the vast majority of small banks) belong to either the cooperative sector (in the 1990s
about 70% of all banks) or the savings banks’ sector (almost 20%). Both sectors consist of an “upper
tier” of large banks serving as head institutions. The “lower tier” banks generally entertain very close
relationships to the head institutions of their respective sector, leading to an internal liquidity
management: on average, the “lower tier” banks deposit short-term funds with the “upper tier” banks,
and receive long-term loans in turn.16
Similar structures can be found in many countries of the euro area. In Austria, 750 of 799 banks in
1996 belonged to the savings banks or credit cooperative network, which have structures comparable
to those described for Germany. In Finland, cooperative banks are organised in the OKO Bank group,
which has a centralised liquidity management. In Spain, on the other hand, savings and cooperative
banks’ networks exist, but their central institutions play only a relatively minor role.
2.2 Some conjectures on the role of banks in monetary policy transmission
The structure of the banking markets in the individual countries is likely to determine the response of
bank lending to monetary policy. Several features of European banking markets are significantly
different from those found in the US. It is therefore most likely that the distributional effects across
banks that have been documented for the US will not be identical to those we can expect for the
countries of the euro area. Additionally, there are significant differences across European countries,
such that we would not necessarily expect results to be identical for the various countries.
One important issue is the relevance of informational frictions in the banking markets. If depositors
and players in the interbank markets are confronted with strong informational asymmetries, then
distributional effects are likely to occur between banks that are informationally opaque to different
                                                                
16 See Upper and Worms (2001) and Deutsche Bundesbank (2001, p. 57).
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degrees. This would suggest the use of the size criterion as is standard in the literature. However,
several features mentioned above are capable of reducing the importance of informational frictions in
Europe significantly. A first indication that in general, informational asymmetries may be less
important is the relatively low risk involved in lending to banks, given the few numbers of bank
failures experienced in many countries.
The role of governments in the banking markets similarly reduces the risk of depositors: An active
role of the state in the banking sector is obviously able to reduce the amount of informational
asymmetries significantly. Publicly owned or guaranteed banks are therefore unlikely to suffer a
disproportionate drain of funds after a monetary tightening, and distributional effects in their loan
reactions are hence unlikely to occur.
Under a government guarantee, it is also possible that weaker banks engage in a “gamble for
resurrection” by extending their loan portfolio despite potential increases in its riskiness. Evidence
for this is provided in Virhiälä (1997, p.166), who detects such a pattern among cooperative banks in
Finland during the early 1990s. He finds, that the lower the degree of capitalisation of a bank, the
more expansive was its loan supply.
The extensive degree of effective deposit insurance in countries like Germany and Italy makes it
furthermore difficult to believe that deposits at small banks are riskier than deposits held at large
banks.
The network arrangement between banks can also have important consequences for the reaction of
bank loan supply to monetary policy. In networks with strong links between the head institutions and
the lower tier, the large banks in the upper tier can serve as liquidity providers in times of a monetary
tightening, such that the system would experience a net flow of funds from the head institutions to
the small member banks. Ehrmann and Worms (2001) show that in Germany, indeed, small banks
receive a net inflow of funds from their head institutions following a monetary contraction. This
indicates that the size of a bank need not be a good proxy to assess distributional effects of monetary
policy across banks.
Additionally, banking networks consist frequently of mutual assistance agreements, as is the case for
example for the Austrian and German credit cooperative sectors. These help to diminish
informational asymmetries for a single bank, since it is the sector as a whole rather than the single
bank that determines the riskiness of a financial engagement with a member bank.
Under the assumption that relationship lending implies that banks shelter their customers from the
effects of monetary policy to some degree, we would expect that those banks show a muted reaction
in their lending behaviour. Since it is often small banks which maintain these tight lending
relationships, it might very well be that smaller banks react less strongly to monetary policy than
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large banks (which would be the opposite to the findings for the US). At least, size does not always
need to be a good indicator for distributional effects across banks. Of course, the small banks need to
have the necessary sources of funds at hand to maintain their loan portfolio even in times of
monetary tightenings. This can be either achieved through a higher degree of liquidity of those banks
like, e.g., in Italy or in France, through the liquidity provisions within the bank networks as, e.g., in
Germany, and/or thanks to a better capitalisation as in France, Italy and Spain.
Overall, we would therefore expect the consequences of informational frictions to be much less
important in most countries of the euro area than they are in the US. The reaction of a bank’s lending
might thus depend much more on the importance it attributes to maintaining a lending relationship
than on the necessity to fund a certain loan portfolio. In most European countries, the role of size as a
bank characteristic that explains differential loan supply reactions to monetary policy could be either
irrelevant or possibly even reversed with respect to the usual assumptions of the literature. However,
there may still be distributional effects, which might depend more on other factors. For example, in
some European countries, some groups of small banks have traditionally acted as collectors of retail
deposits to the whole banking system. Consequently, those banks tend to be more liquid on average.
It may be the case that these banks react differently to monetary policy changes.
In order to understand how strong distributional effects across banks are in the various countries, and
which bank characteristics should be relevant, it is therefore necessary to consider the institutional
peculiarities of each country.17 Table 3 looks at the various characteristics discussed above and
provides a rough ranking of the euro area countries. Relationship lending, for example, emerges as an
important feature in Austria, Germany and Italy. We would expect that some banks in these countries
shelter their customers from monetary policy tightenings, with an accordingly muted response of
their lending. Bank characteristics like size that proxy informational asymmetries should not be
particularly revealing in most of the euro area countries. In particular, in countries like Austria or
Germany, where bank networks are important and many banks are publicly owned or guaranteed, or
in Finland, where for some time there has been a government guarantee and most banks are
organised within a banking group, we would not believe that a smaller bank is subject to stronger
informational asymmetries and as such forced to reduce its lending more strongly after a monetary
tightening.
                                                                
17 Several papers have already ranked countries with respect to the effectiveness of a bank lending channel (Kashyap and
Stein (1997), Cecchetti (1999), DNB (2000)). They rely on indicators from three main categories: the importance of small
banks, bank health, and the availability of alternative finance. Despite differences with respect to some countries, the
rankings reach relatively similar conclusions. For the four largest economies, both Kashyap and Stein (1997) and Cecchetti
(1999) rank Italy as the strongest, France and Germany in the mid range, and Spain as the country with the least exposure to
a bank lending channel.
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3. The model
We base our analysis of bank lending on a very simple version of the model by Bernanke and Blinder
(1988). We restrict the model of the deposit market to an equilibrium relationship, assuming that
deposits ( D ) equal money ( M ) and that both depend on the policy interest rate i  as follows:
cy +-== iDM (1)
The demand for loans ( diL ) which a bank faces is assumed to depend on real GDP (y ), the price
level ( p ) and the interest rate on loans ( li ):
l
d
i ipyL 321 fff -+= (2)
The supply of loans of a bank ( siL ) depends on the amount of money (or deposits) available, the
interest rate on loans and the monetary policy rate directly. This direct effect of the monetary policy
rate arises in the presence of opportunity costs for the bank, when banks use the interbank market to
finance their loans or in the case of mark-up pricing by banks, which pass on increases in deposit
rates to lending rates.18 The supply of loans is therefore modelled as:
iiDL lii
s
i 54 ffm -+= (3)
We furthermore assume that not all banks are equally dependent on deposits. We model the impact of
deposit changes to be lower, the higher the bank characteristics size, liquidity or capitalisation ( ix ):
ii x10 mmm -= (4)
The clearing of the loan market, together with equations (1) and (4), leads to the reduced form of the
model:
43
3130313054241 )(
ff
cfmcfmyfmfymfffff
+
-+++-+
= iii
xixipy
L (5)
which can be simplified to
constdxixcicbpayL iii +++-+= 10 (6)
                                                                
18 For the reaction of interest rates to monetary policy at the aggregate level, Mojon (2000) provides evidence for several
countries of the euro area. For some evidence at the bank level for France, see Baumel and Sevestre (2000).
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The coefficient 
43
31
1 ff
yfm
+
=c  relates the reaction of bank lending to monetary policy to the bank
characteristic. Under the assumptions of the above model, a significant parameter for 1c  implies that
monetary policy affects loan supply. This requires, in particular, that the interest elasticity of loan
demand which is faced by a bank is independent of its characteristic ix , i.e. 3f  is the same across all
banks.
This assumption of a homogeneous reaction of loan demand across banks is therefore crucial for the
identification of loan supply effects of monetary policy. It excludes cases where, for example, large
or small bank customers are more interest rate sensitive. Given that bank loans are the main source of
financing for firms in the euro area, and readily available substitutes in times of monetary tightenings
are very limited even for relatively large firms, we see this as a reasonable benchmark for most
countries. Several of the companion papers can improve on this identification issue by including
bank specific loan demand proxies that allow for differences in loan demand across banks. The
results seem to be rather robust to these changes (see, e.g., Worms, 2001).
Moreover, in the empirical model, we allow for asymmetric responses of bank lending to GDP and
prices by the inclusion of these variables interacted with the bank characteristics.19 We also introduce
some dynamics and estimate the model in first differences.20 The regression model is therefore
specified as in equation (7):
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with Ni ,...,1=  and iTt ,...,1=  and where N  denotes the number of banks and l  the number of lags.
itL  are the loans of bank i  in quarter t  to private non-banks. trD  represents the first difference of a
nominal short-term interest rate, )log( tGDPD  the growth rate of real GDP, and tflin  the inflation
rate. The bank specific characteristics are given as itx . The model allows for fixed effects across
banks, as indicated by the bank specific intercept ia .
The approach followed in model (7) is based on the assumption that we can capture the relevant time
effect with the inclusion of the macroeconomic variables. We estimate a second model with a
                                                                
19 This is equivalent to allowing for different values of f1 and f2 among banks with different size, liquidity and
capitalisation.
20 The underlying idea is that banks react to a change in the interest rate by adjusting the new loans. Since the average
maturity of loans in Europe is longer than one year, the level of loans approximates the stock of loans for both quarterly and
annual data, whereas the flow can be approximated by the first difference. In the estimates below, the exact specification
may change from country to country, depending on the empirical properties of the data (see the Appendix for the exact
specification in each case).
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complete set of time dummies, in order to ensure that this assumption holds. This second model is
therefore estimated as
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where all variables are defined as before, and tl  describes the time dummies.
We see a comparison of the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms between the two models
as a sort of specification test. To the extent that they are similar it gives us some confidence that we
can use model (7) to infer the direct effect of interest rates on lending for the average bank from the
coefficients jc .
In both models, the distributional effects of monetary policy should be reflected in a significant
interaction term of the bank specific characteristic with the monetary policy indicator. The usual
assumptions met in the literature are that a small, less liquid or less capitalised bank21 reacts more
strongly to the monetary policy change than a bank with a high value of the respective bank
characteristic. This would imply positive coefficients on the interaction terms.
As a monetary policy indicator, we use the change in the short term interest rate. The three measures
for bank characteristics size (S), liquidity (Liq) and capitalisation (Cap) are defined as follows:
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Size is measured by the log of total assets, Ait. Liquidity is defined as the ratio of liquid assets Lit
(cash, interbank lending and securities) to total assets, and capitalisation is given by the ratio of
capital and reserves, Cit, to total assets.
All three criteria are normalised with respect to their average across all the banks in the respective
sample in order to get indicators that sum to zero over all observations. For the regression model (7),
the average of the interaction term jtit rx -- D1  is therefore zero, too, and the parameters jc  are directly
interpretable as the overall monetary policy effects on loans. In case of size, we normalise not just
                                                                
21 For size, see e.g. Kashyap and Stein (1995), for liquidity, see, e.g. Kashyap and Stein (2000) and for capital, see, e.g.,
Peek and Rosengren (1995).
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with respect to the mean over the whole sample period, but also with respect to each single period.
This removes unwanted trends in size (reflecting that size is measured in nominal terms).
Due to the inclusion of lags of the dependent variable, we use the GMM estimator suggested by
Arellano and Bond (1991). This ensures efficiency and consistency of our estimates, provided that
instruments are adequately chosen to take into account the serial correlation properties of the model
(the validity of these instruments is tested for with the standard Sargan test). To ensure
econometrically sound estimates for each country, the harmonised model needs to be amended
slightly country by country, e.g. by choosing the appropriate treatment of seasonality, lag structure
and an adequate set of instrumental variables. The actual regression models for each country are
therefore slight modifications of equations (7) and (8).
We will estimate models (7) and (8) using two different datasets. The first is BankScope, a publicly
available database provided by the rating agency Fitch Ibca that covers balance sheet data on banks
in all the euro area countries, although not the full population in each. This data is available on an
annual basis only. It has been used in all published papers for the euro area that are based on
microdata on banks so far. The second dataset consists of bank balance sheet data collected by the
national central banks of the euro area. These data are likely to be of a better quality, because they
are available at least on a quarterly basis and cover the full population of banks in a country. To
provide a comprehensive picture and to enable an assessment of the adequacy of BankScope for this
type of exercise, we will make parallel use of both types of datasets.
4. Evidence from BankScope data
The existing literature on the role of banks in monetary policy transmission in Europe has so far been
using the publicly available database BankScope. In order to achieve comparability with those
studies, we will provide estimates on the basis of BankScope in this section. In the subsequent
section we will then move on to the more comprehensive datasets available in the Eurosystem. This
will give an indication as to how representative the BankScope results are.
The existing studies using BankScope show rather inconclusive results.22 For instance, both de Bondt
(1999) and King (2000) report that size and liquidity are important bank characteristics. However,
they find such effects in different countries. Whereas King identifies them in France and Italy, de
Bondt finds them to be particularly weak in these two countries. Instead, he finds evidence for size
and liquidity effects in the Netherlands, which King does not.
                                                                
22 Favero et al. (1999) find that loan growth is unrelated to size or liquidity in 1992 (a year when there was supposed to be a
tightening of monetary policy).
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Table 4: Comparison of the coverage of BankScope with the full population (1998)
France Germany Italy Spain
BankScope 456 2021 576 159Number
of banks Eurosystem datasets 1191 3246 918 396
BankScope 9997 3413 3657 8422Average total assets
(in mio euros) Eurosystem datasets 2365 1583 1671 2283
BankScope 1180 364 216 1599Median total
assets (in mio euros) Eurosystem datasets 164 182 141 302
Note that the use of consolidated balance sheet data in BankScope, by counting also bank holdings abroad, leads to the sum
of total assets for some countries to exceed the actual sum of total assets within that country.
Beyond the differences in specification, these contrasting results may be attributed to two intrinsic
weaknesses of the BankScope data. First, the data are collected annually, which might be too
infrequent to capture the adjustment of loans following a change in interest rates. Second, the sample
of banks available in BankScope is biased toward large banks. This is shown for the four largest
countries of the euro area in Table 4.23 The coverage of the population of banks ranges from about
40% in France and in Spain to a little bit more than 60% in Italy and in Germany. However, the
median and average bank size is several times larger in BankScope than in the actual population.
In terms of market share this poses less of a problem, since, as described in section 2.2, the larger
banks make up a disproportionately larger fraction of the total loans. The biases are, however,
stronger for the beginning of the sample (1992-1999), since the coverage of BankScope has
improved markedly over the years.
BankScope data offer the choice between consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheets. For the
purposes of this paper, we opted for consolidated balance sheets whenever available, and
unconsolidated balance sheets otherwise. In order to assess financial constraints and informational
asymmetries of a bank, it is important to know whether a bank is in fact a subsidiary of another,
potentially large and well known, bank. In such a case, using the subsidiary’s unconsolidated balance
sheet would lead to a biased measurement of the informational problems of the bank. However, this
choice is not without drawbacks. As mentioned in table 4, consolidated balance sheets can potentially
exaggerate the size of a bank, especially if a bank is internationally oriented, and has bank holdings
abroad. This might create problems when looking at individual countries, where the mismeasurement
due to international operations of domestic banks is larger than when looking at evidence on the euro
area aggregate level.
                                                                
23 Table A6 in the appendix extends the comparison to all countries of the euro area. Whereas for some countries the
coverage is extremely poor (most noticeably for Finland, where only 5% of all banks are covered by BankScope, and where
the average size of a bank in BankScope is roughly 50 times as big as the average bank in the actual population. This comes
about because BankScope treats OKO Bank as one bank only), it is fair for many other countries.
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4.1 Evidence on the aggregate euro area level
To assess the role of banks in monetary transmission at the euro area level, we first estimate model
(7) with the full BankScope dataset, i.e. including observations on banks in all euro area countries,
without discriminating for national parameters. In order to proxy loan demand and the monetary
policy changes for each bank as closely as possible, we regress loan growth of a bank in country z on
country z’s GDP growth, inflation rate and the interest rate change. The model is therefore
formulated as in equation (7a).
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Table 5:
Long-run coefficients estimated in model (7a), BankScope data for the euro area
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
Euro area
BankScope data
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size
Liquidity
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
-1.321*** -0.527** -0.309 -1.539*** -1.494***Monetary policy 0.000 0.040 0.151 0.000 0.000
1.881*** 0.885** 1.369*** 1.689*** 1.550***Real GDP
0.000 0.023 0.002 0.000 0.000
1.947*** 0.105 0.642 0.846* 0.861**Prices 0.000 0.812 0.111 0.083 0.047
0.231** -5.105*** 4.293 0.416*** 0.408***Char1*MP 0.050 0.003 0.167 0.004 0.003
-1.392 -1.686Char2*MP
0.430 0.398
3.875Char3*MP
0.248
0.422Char1*Char2*MP
0.605
p-val Sargan 0.069 0.631 0.753 0.558 0.320
p-val MA1, MA2 0.000 0.453 0.000 0.325 0.000 0.948 0.000 0.860 0.000 0.897
No of banks, obs. 3029 9662 2637 7963 2990 9507 2474 7370 2579 7766
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are p-values.
The main results for model (7a) are summarised in table 5.24 Each column presents the results from
one of the specifications – first models with one of the bank characteristics each, then one model with
all three characteristics simultaneously, and last a specification where size and liquidity enter, both in
single and double interactions. Through double interactions, it is possible to test whether the effect of
liquidity depends on the size of banks. The underlying idea is similar in spirit to Kashyap and Stein
                                                                
24 Table A8 shows that the time effects are well captured, since the coefficients in a model with time dummies do not
change very much.
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(2000), and assumes that the relief a bank gets from additional liquidity should be the larger, the
smaller the bank.
We report the estimated long-run coefficients only. These are calculated as the sum of the
coefficients of the various lags of the indicated variable, divided by one minus the sum of the
coefficients on the lagged endogenous variable.
The model with size as the only bank characteristic performs best – size dominates all other
characteristics, both in the specification with all three of them and in the one with double
interactions. The average bank reduces lending after a monetary tightening by 1.3% following a 100
basis point increase in interest rates. Smaller banks, however, reduce their lending by more than large
banks do.
Whereas capitalisation does not enter the models significantly, liquidity at first sight seems to be a
good discriminatory device to trace the differential loan response of banks, too, given the highly
significant interaction term (which has an unexpected negative sign). However, this model is not
robust. Table A8 reveals that the liquidity specification is not stable when the macro variables are
replaced by time dummies.25
4.2 Evidence on single countries in a pooled regression
The regression performed in the preceding section treated all banks in the same way by restricting all
coefficients to be the same across countries. In this section, the model is extended to exploit the
information on cross-country differences. The parameters of interest, i.e. those on the bank
characteristic, the first difference of the interest rate, and the interaction of the two, are now allowed
to vary across countries through the introduction of country specific dummies:
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where the set of country dummies is denoted by cc . The model is again estimated with size,
capitalisation and liquidity as discriminatory bank characteristics, leaving aside more complicated
                                                                
25 This result might be driven by the fact that a liquidity measure is provided only for relatively few banks in some countries
covered in BankScope. For example, only one third of observations are available in the Italian case.
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models with two or three characteristics. Table A9 reports the estimated coefficients and standard
errors on monetary policy and the interaction term for each country.26
This model cannot replicate the results obtained at the aggregate euro area level. The coefficients on
Germany in the specification with size suggest that the large number of German banks (roughly 50%
in the sample) dominates the results, although this is not the case for the other specifications. In any
case, these results are very difficult to interpret with respect to the role of banks in the individual
countries.
There are two potential explanations for this result. On the one hand, it might be that there is a
considerable degree of heterogeneity in the data, which would imply that pooling the data and
restricting the coefficients to be identical across countries does not necessarily constitute a useful
exercise. On the other hand, the aggregate model contains more variability in the interest rates; with
national interest rates, the model incorporates a much richer variation in interest rates on which it can
draw inference, namely across time in each country, but also across countries for a given time. This
additional variation can potentially alleviate problems stemming from the short sample of the
BankScope data.
4.3 Evidence on France, Germany, Italy and Spain in separate regressions
This section presents results from re-estimating model (7a) separately for each of the four largest
countries of the euro area. These countries have the largest cross-sectional dimension, so that it might
be possible to improve on the results of the preceding section for these countries. This also allows us
to check for the consistency of the BankScope results with those reported in the subsequent section,
obtained at the national level with the more comprehensive datasets. Table A7 presents the results of
these regressions, and table A8 shows that the results of estimating model (8) are very similar.
For most of the estimated models, a tightening of monetary policy leads to the expected decrease of
loans. However, with the exception of Germany, the results lack significance and robustness. The
most extreme case is France, where not a single coefficient turns out to be significant and several
coefficients even change sign across the different models. Also in Spain and Italy, the coefficients on
the macro variables depend on the exact model specification, and frequently change sign. For Spain,
the specification with liquidity as bank specific characteristic results as the model with the most
significantly estimated effects, suggesting that banks with a lower degree of liquidity react more
strongly. For Germany, the country with by far the best coverage in BankScope, the parameters are
                                                                
26 The “national coefficients” are calculated as )( 1
1
0 cjjj c w+S =  and )( 21
1
0 cjjj g w+S = . The robustness tests for this
model have been performed with either a set of time dummies, or alternatively a set of time dummies per country. The
results are robust to these changes.
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generally estimated to be significantly different from zero. The average bank reacts to a monetary
tightening by decreasing loans. This coefficient is always estimated to be negative and significant at
the 1% level, but its size varies considerably across the different specifications.
The lack of robustness and the few specifications that achieve significant estimates cast some doubt
on the adequacy of BankScope to capture the distributional effects of monetary policy across banks.
5. Evidence from Eurosystem datasets
In this section, we employ the Eurosystem datasets for national models for each of the four largest
countries of the euro area, and report the analysis of similar models for the other euro area countries
covered in the companion papers. The results of models (7) and (8) for France, Germany, Italy and
Spain are presented in tables 6a-6d and A10.27
The long-run effects of monetary policy on loans of an average bank are estimated to be negative in
all countries, indicating that restrictive monetary policy reduces loan supply in the long run. As we
had conjectured in section 2, size does not emerge as a useful indicator for the distributional effects
of monetary policy. In the specifications with size only, we find it to be insignificant in France,
Germany and Italy, and significantly negative in Spain. 28 Hence, the role of size as an indicator of
informational asymmetries appears irrelevant in all countries, which is consistent with the structure
of the banking market. Also capitalisation does not play an important role in distinguishing banks’
reactions. Its interaction with the monetary policy indicator is insignificant in all countries, both
when used as the only characteristic as well as in the complete specification with all three criteria.
This could be caused by several reasons. For example, the measure of capitalisation we use could be
too crude to capture the riskiness of a bank, and is thus not indicative for the informational
asymmetry problems. This could very well be the case, since our capitalisation variable is derived
from balance sheets without considering the structure of the loan portfolio or its risk characteristics.
It might therefore not be capturing a risk-based measure like the Basel capital requirement.29
An alternative explanation could be that all banks are operating at levels of capitalisation sufficiently
high to prevent market participants’ doubts on the soundness of a bank. In such a case, capitalisation
does not determine a bank’s reaction to monetary policy any longer. Loupias et al. (2001) have
estimated a model with a double interaction of size and capitalisation with monetary policy. This is a
way to check whether, after a monetary policy tightening, small and under-capitalised banks restrict
                                                                
27 A description of the sample periods, the outlier detection methods and the exact specifications can be found in the
appendix.
28 For Italy, this is consistent with previous work analysing lending rates, e.g. Angeloni et al. (1995) and Cottarelli et al.
(1995).
29 The BIS ratio measure cannot be obtained from the available datasets for the four largest countries.
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their loan supply by more than large banks do. The paper does not find any significant coefficient,
thus confirming that capitalisation does not seem to affect banks loan supply in a significant way, at
least in France. Moreover, when comparing the level of capitalisation of European banks with those
in the US (see table A3), it can easily be seen that (with the notable exception of Germany where, as
stated in section 2, the asset structure of banks is less risky), banks in Europe are much better
capitalised.
Table 6a: Long-run coefficients estimated in model (7), national datasets: France
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
France
(Eurosystem data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
-1.564** -2.131*** -1.823*** -1.969*** -2.221***Monetary policy
0.765 0.736 0.701 0.566 0.697
3.239*** 3.999*** 3.788*** 2.975*** 2.523***Real GDP
0.578 0.493 0.503 0.374 0.470
-2.850*** -4.173*** -3.701*** -3.678*** -3.147***Prices
0.742 0.692 0.689 0.512 0.644
-0.458 4.030 3.547 -0.063 -0.184Char1*MP
0.553 4.734 15.236 0.218 0.235
8.106*** 7.070***Char2*MP
1.931 2.010
2.304Char3*MP
7.007
-0.262 -1.255 -16.48Char1*Real GDP
0.785 7.508 25.648
-0.070 -1.637 5.303Char1*Prices
0.714 6.143 24.351
0.390Char1*Char2*MP
1.228
p-val Sargan 0.142 0.233 0.111 0.231 0.075
p-val MA1, MA2 0.014 0.451 0.006 0.326 0.017 0.542 0.000 0.387 0.000 0.450
No of banks, obs. 312 5327 312 5327 312 5327 312 5327 312 5327
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are standard errors.
Table 6b: Long-run coefficients estimated in model (7), national datasets: Germany
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
Germany
(Eurosystem data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
-1.662*** -0.857*** -0.695*** -0.526*** -0.679***Monetary policy
0.737 0.238 0.239 0.202 0.205
0.071 0.119 -0.034 0.079 0.008Real GDP
0.296 0.163 0.167 0.135 0.138
3.120*** 2.039*** 1.965*** 1.662*** 1.842***Prices
0.803 0.347 0.350 0.280 0.286
-0.117 3.547*** 1.935 -0.044 0.003Char1*MP
0.127 1.100 6.300 0.036 0.045
3.936*** 4.689***Char2*MP
0.883 0.885
-0.469Char3*MP
5.340
0.167 -2.960* 1.533Char1*Real GDP
0.167 1.398 10.293
-0.561*** 2.872 9.328Char1*Prices
0.252 2.405 14.320
-1.082*Char1*Char2*MP
0.551
p-val Sargan 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
p-val MA1, MA2 0.000 0.184 0.000 0.421 0.000 0.276 0.000 0.351 0.000 0.344
No of banks, obs. 2689 48402 2693 48474 2708 48744 2651 47718 2659 47862
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are standard errors.
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Table 6c: Long-run coefficients estimated in model (7), national datasets: Italy
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
Italy
(Eurosystem data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
-0.703*** -0.529*** -0.695*** -0.825*** -0.675***Monetary policy
0.103 0.102 0.102 0.127 0.113
1.363*** 1.879*** 1.419*** 1.389*** 1.084***Real GDP
0.175 0.162 0.173 0.213 0.175
0.230 -1.931*** 0.101 -0.622 -0.264Prices
0.302 0.307 0.308 0.386 0.338
-0.009 2.593** 4.226 0.079 -0.046Char1*MP
0.025 1.284 1.499 0.054 0.073
2.278*** 2.058***Char2*MP
0.831 0.574
3.616Char3*MP
3.099
-1.238Char1*Char2*MP
0.8450
p-val Sargan 0.196 0.079 0.186 0.077 0.062
p-val MA1, MA2 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.246 0.000 0.116 0.000 0.128 0.000 0.156
No of banks, obs. 587 25241 587 25241 587 25241 587 25241 587 25241
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are standard errors.
Table 6d: Long-run coefficients estimated in model (7), national datasets: Spain
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
Spain
(Eurosystem data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
-0.993** -1.862*** -1.314*** -1.510*** -1.593***Monetary policy 0.453 0.441 0.487 0.433 0.422
2.022*** 1.689*** 1.878*** 1.695*** 1.818***Real GDP
0.359 0.347 0.357 0.326 0.327
-1.092*** -1.979*** -0.985*** -2.074*** -2.066***Prices
0.315 0.465 0.368 0.387 0.414
-0.253** 6.061*** 0.365 -0.214* -0.153Char1*MP
0.114 2.072 8.393 0.128 0.109
3.986** 5.277***Char2*MP
1.905 1.879
-11.304Char3*MP
9.112
2.010*Char1*Char2*MP
1.161
p-val Sargan 0.852 0.838 0.888 1.000 1.000
p-val MA1, MA2 0.374 0.952 0.264 0.770 0.130 0.967 0.458 0.913 0.499 0.880
No of banks, obs. 210 4012 210 4012 210 4012 210 4012 210 4012
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are standard errors.
The third bank characteristic, the degree of liquidity, turns out to be a highly significant indicator for
distributional effects across banks in Germany, Italy and Spain. In the specifications with all three
bank characteristics, it dominates the other characteristics for those countries, and now becomes the
significant and dominant characteristic also for France.
Looking at the more detailed analysis in the national companion papers, results for Spain appear to
be less robust than in the case of the other countries. Indeed, this result disappears when looking at
the response of different types of loans and at the response of loans to an exogenous shock to
deposits (Hernando and Martínez-Pagés, 2001). Therefore, in the case of Spain, the distributional
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effects across banks with different degrees of liquidity do not appear to be related to loan supply
effects.
On the other hand, the results for the other countries are very robust. For Germany, it turns out that
the result is driven by the short-term interbank deposits that many small banks with a network
affiliation hold with their head institutions (Worms, 2001). For Italy, the analysis is extended to the
role of deposits and liquidity. It is shown that deposits drop sharpest for those banks that have fewer
incentives to shield their deposits, like, e.g., small banks with a deposit to loan ratio larger than one.
The analysis of liquidity supports the idea that banks use their liquidity to maintain their loan
portfolio (Gambacorta, 2001b). For France too, this conclusion appears to be robust, both to different
measures of the liquidity ratio and to the specific treatment of mutual and cooperative banks
networks (Loupias et al., 2001).
The positive coefficient on the interaction of the monetary policy indicator with the degree of
liquidity in France, Germany and Italy means that less liquid banks show a stronger reduction in
lending after a monetary tightening than relatively more liquid banks do. The underlying reasoning is
that banks with more liquid balance sheets can use their liquid assets to maintain their loan portfolio
and as such are affected less heavily by a monetary policy tightening. The robustness of these results
can be checked through the last column of table 6 that includes the double interaction between size
and liquidity. The double interaction has the expected negative sign in Germany and Italy, but is
insignificant in the case of Italy and only weakly significant for the case of Germany. Hence, there is
no strong evidence that the effect of liquidity is stronger for smaller banks; the conclusion that size is
not the dominant characteristic that distinguishes banks' responses to monetary policy does therefore
obtain further support.
When comparing the BankScope regression results of section 4.3 with those based on the national
datasets, the results generally do not agree. (The exception is Spain when liquidity is used as the bank
characteristic.) The Eurosystem datasets, through their much larger variation both across banks and
time, seem to be superior to the BankScope data, as evidenced by the improved explanatory power of
the models and the better significance and robustness of results. This casts doubt on the usefulness of
the BankScope dataset for studies of the micro effects across banks. Through the representation bias
towards large banks, important heterogeneity in bank behaviour is lost.
Several companion papers provide an analysis along similar lines for several other countries of the
euro area. De Haan (2001) finds for the Netherlands that interest rate increases reduce unsecured
bank lending, and provides evidence that size, degree of liquidity and capitalisation all matter for a
bank’s reaction in this market segment. Another split according to bank types shows that wholesale
banks react more strongly to monetary policy than retail banks. Looking at table 3, these findings can
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be explained by the fact that the role of government is weak in the Netherlands, such that banks
cannot rely on government guarantees to attract financing. There are also no important bank
networks in the Netherlands. Thus, the Netherlands appears to be a case where the usual
informational asymmetry problems might play a bigger role than in many other countries of the euro
area. Interestingly, the split according to retail and wholesale banks can be reconciled with the fact
that relationship lending is important in this country.
A paper on Portugal (Farinha and Marques, 2001) finds similarly that monetary policy tightenings
reduce bank lending. Here, the capitalisation of banks plays an important role for the way banks
respond to interest rate changes, whereas the other tested criteria size and liquidity do not. They
report furthermore, that the models are subject to a structural break when Portuguese banks had the
possibility to access funds from foreign EU banks. Interestingly, during this period the growth rate of
loans increased relative to the growth of deposits, suggesting that this improved availability of funds
matters for the growth rate of lending.
Brissimis et al. (2001) investigate the Greek case, and conclude that both the size and the liquidity of
a bank determine distributional effects. Although there has been a strong involvement of the
government, proxies for informational asymmetries seem to be important in Greece. This is
consistent with the absence of bank networks, so that each bank’s own creditworthiness is relevant.
However, it has to be noted that, as is described in more detail in the paper, the Bank of Greece
managed to tightly control the banking activities by applying a reserve requirement of 12% (and of
effectively 100% for deposits in foreign currencies).
Kaufmann (2001) looks at Austrian data, and detects distributional effects across banks only for
subperiods of the sample. When they are found, it is the degree of liquidity that matters rather than
size. This is in line with our results for Germany, and consistent with the similarity of the two
banking systems as evidenced in table 3. Interestingly, monetary policy is effective only in times of
economic slowdowns, as opposed to times of high growth.
Looking at the case of Finland, Topi and Vilmunen (2001) find that bank lending contracts after
interest rate increases. Monetary policy does seem to affect all banks alike, however. Only liquidity is
marginally significant in its interaction with monetary policy. This is in line with our conjecture of
section 2, that the state guarantees in the aftermath of the banking crisis, which were maintained in
parts of the sample period they study, change the lending behaviour of banks. Interestingly, the
authors provide further evidence in this direction: a dummy variable for the state guarantees enters
significantly in their regressions, indicating that the bank support measures themselves might have
contributed to the increase in the growth rate of loans.
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6. Macroeoconomic relevance
Since the results presented in the preceding section are based on panel data regressions, the long-run
coefficient on the monetary policy indicator represents the reaction of the average bank in the
sample. Given the heterogeneity of reactions across banks (as shown through the significant
interaction term with liquidity), the reaction of the average bank need not be informative on the
overall macroeconomic effect of monetary policy on bank loans. We had found that for three
countries, less liquid banks react more strongly. If we want to interpret this finding on a
macroeconomic level, it is important to weight the banks in the sample with their respective market
share when calculating their response to monetary policy. The resulting, overall response of the loan
market can be quite different from the response of the average banks, depending on the distribution
of liquidity and market share across banks. Table A5 presents some evidence on this distribution in
the single countries.
In table 7, we present how the equilibrium quantities in the loan market respond in each country. This
response is calculated by first weighting the liquidity ratio of each bank with its loan market share.30
Doing so yields the liquidity ratio of the loan market as a whole. Then, this ratio is used in the
estimated models to explore overall loan market responses.
The weighted average coefficient implies that the magnitude of the lending reaction is similar in
France and Spain, and similar in Germany and Italy. France and Spain show a much stronger overall
response than Germany and Italy. This finding could for example be explained by the dominance of
relationship lending in the two latter countries – that some banks shield their customers from a
monetary policy tightening seems to be reflected in a lower overall responsiveness of loans.
Table 7: Percentage change of loans following a one percent change in interest rates
Eurosystem data France Germany Italy Spain
-2.637*** -0.926*** -0.944*** -2.415***Overall loan response
0.788 0.236 0.271 0.459
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level.
Interestingly, the same exercise with BankScope arrives at not too dissimilar conclusions. Table A11
reports the respective coefficients, which show that the response is significantly estimated for Spain
and Germany. The response is somewhat stronger for Spain, and for Germany is actually very close
                                                                
30 However, in the case of France, one should keep in mind that only banks with a significant level of deposits have been
kept in the sample, leaving aside many branches of foreign banks, as well as specialised credit institutions which, on the
whole, account for about ¼ of total loans.
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to the one obtained with the full sample. For Germany, therefore, the coverage of large banks is good
enough to portray the relevant market reaction fairly well.31
This observation leads us to believe that BankScope, although a poor instrument to investigate micro
effects across banks, can actually give a fair description of the macro effects. This is easily
understandable as macro effects mainly derive from large banks’ responses to monetary policy
shocks. It is therefore enlightening to calculate the overall response of the euro area loan market from
the BankScope regressions. Looking at the euro area models, the preferred specification is the one
with size as bank characteristic. Repeating the same kind of exercise, we find the market response to
be 261.1-  (significant at the 1% level).
The long-run effect of monetary policy on bank loans is in the range of a 1% decline after a 100 basis
point increase in interest rates in Germany, Italy and the euro area as a whole.32 However, there is
considerable heterogeneity across countries, as shown in the much stronger reaction of French and
Spanish loans.
7. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the role of banks in monetary policy transmission in the euro area. It has
been shown that bank lending contracts significantly after a monetary tightening both on the euro
area aggregate as well as on the country level.
Using micro data on banks, it is found that liquidity is important to characterise a bank’s reaction to a
monetary policy action: less liquid banks react more strongly than more liquid banks do, although not
in all countries. On the other hand, factors like the size or the degree of capitalisation of a bank are
generally not important for the way a bank adjusts its lending to interest rate changes. This is
opposed to findings for the US, where small and lowly capitalised banks show a disproportionately
strong response to monetary policy. We explain the absence of size and capitalisation effects with a
lower degree of informational asymmetries: the role of the government, banking networks, as well as
the low number of bank failures in the countries of the euro area contribute to a reduction in
informational frictions. Proxies for informational asymmetry are therefore less informative in the
European case than they are in the US.
                                                                
31 Interestingly, the lower frequency of the BankScope data seems to be less problematic for analysing the distributional
effects than the coverage bias. When the Eurosystem dataset on German banks is used to analyse the distributional effects
amongst large banks only, then size turns out to be a significant determinant, just like in the BankScope regressions
reported in this paper (see Worms, 2001). This indicates that the differences in frequency between the two datasets are less
of a problem.
32 These estimates are in the same range as those found at the macro level in VAR analyses, e.g., by Peersman and Smets
(2001).
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The way banks respond to monetary policy can be explained by the structure of banking markets.
This finding emerges when comparing the banking systems between Europe and the US, and
matching the empirical findings with differences in the banking structures, as well as in the same
comparison across euro area countries.
We have worked with two different types of datasets in this paper. The publicly available database
BankScope, used in similar studies to date, suffers from a representation bias. Since small banks are
not covered adequately, the microeconomic distributional effects are estimated on a biased sample of
banks. This might explain the contradictory findings in the previous literature as well as the few
cases of coinciding evidence in this and earlier studies. When estimating the macroeconomic
importance of the bank loan response, this bias is less important, however: since the coverage of
large banks is relatively good, both the estimates with BankScope and those with the complete
population of banks arrive at quantitatively similar conclusions. This holds especially for Germany,
which is covered particularly well in BankScope.
The Eurosystem datasets used in this paper have been able to produce a set of stable and robust
results that improves markedly on the existing evidence on the role of banks in monetary policy
transmission in the euro area to date.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N. 011832
APPENDIX 1: Databases and estimation methods
A) The samples
1) Data sources
Eurosystem datasets for France, Italy and Spain: respective national banks supervisory reports.
Eurosystem dataset for Germany: Bundesbank banks’ balance sheets statistics. BankScope: Fitch
Ibca, a publicly accessible source. The Eurosystem datasets are on a quarterly basis while BankScope
provides annual data. BankScope data are consolidated balance sheets when available, and
unconsolidated balance sheets otherwise.
2) Merger treatment
For all countries, mergers have been treated by a backward aggregation of the entities involved in the
merger. Other kinds of treatments have shown to have little impact on the econometric results. No
merger treatment with the BankScope data.
3) Criteria defining banks and sample initial coverage
Credit specialised financial institutions are excluded from the sample in France, Italy and Spain. For
Spain, also branches of foreign banks are excluded from the sample. For France, each mutual bank
network (except for one of them) is considered as an aggregate bank. Banks with less than 10 %
deposits (which are mostly foreign banks are discarded from the sample). Banks with less than 1 %
loans are also discarded. Before the necessary trimming of the samples, but after the merger
treatment, the coverage is as follows:
Table A1: Initial sample coverage
Period Number of banks
BankScope 1992 – 1999 4425
France 1993:Q1 to 2000:Q3 496
Germany 1993:Q1 to 1998:Q4 3281
Italy 1986:Q4to 1998:Q4 785
Spain 1991:Q1 to 1998:Q4 264
4) Trimming of the sample/outlier elimination.
For France, Italy and Spain, only banks with both non-null loans and deposits are kept in the sample.
For Germany and BankScope, this positivity condition only applies to loans.
Criteria defining outliers are as follows:
1st difference in logs is, for each period,
below (above)
1st difference in the ratio of liquidity
and capitalisation over total assets is,
for each period, below (above)
BankScope 4th (96th) percentile for loans, deposits
and total assets
4th (96th) percentile
France 2nd (98th) percentile for loans, deposits
and total assets
1st (99th) percentile
Germany 2nd (98th) percentile for loans and 1st
(99th) percentile for total assets
1st (99th) percentile of the ratios level
Italy 1st (99th) percentile for loans
Spain 2nd (98th) percentile for total assets and
3rd (99th) percentile for loans
2nd (98th) percentile or 3rd (99th)
percentile of the ratios level
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NB: For Germany and Italy, banks with one outlier or more are fully discarded from the sample.
Moreover, for Germany and BankScope, different samples have been built for size, liquidity and
capitalisation.
5) Number of consecutive lags required:
Due to the model specification as well as the estimation methods requiring numerous lags, we
required a minimal number of consecutive observations of the first difference of the log of loans (and
correspondingly for the other variables in the model): 2 lags for BankScope, 5 for France, 4 for
Germany, 12 for Italy, and 9 for Spain.
The final composition of the samples used for econometric estimations is thus:
Table A2: Econometric samples coverage
Estimation period Number of banks Number of observations
BankScope 1993 – 1999 Around 3000 Around 9700
France 1994:Q3 to 2000:Q3 312 5327
Germany 1994:Q1 to 1998:Q4 Around 2700 Around 48000
Italy 1988:Q1 to 1998:Q4 587 28763
Spain 1991:Q1 to 1998:Q4 210 4012
B) Variable definitions
1) Loans
For all countries, loans are those to the non-financial private sector. For Italy and France, bad loans
are excluded.
2) Liquidity
The liquidity ratio is computed by dividing liquid by total assets. The precise definition of liquidity
changes a bit from country to country, due to differences in the available information: In France, it is
constructed as cash and interbank deposits. In Germany, it includes cash, short-term interbank
deposits and government securities. In Italy, it comprises cash, interbank deposits and securities and
repurchase agreements at book value. In Spain, liquid assets include cash, interbank lending and
government securities. For BankScope, this variable is pre-defined in the database. For all countries,
the ratio liquidity/total assets is centred with respect to its overall sample mean.
3) Capitalisation
For all countries, capitalisation is defined as the sum of capital and reserves divided by total assets.
For BankScope, this variable is pre-defined in the database. Also capitalisation has been centred with
respect to its overall sample mean.
4) Size
For all countries and BankScope, size is defined as the log of total assets. This variable is centred
with respect to each period’s mean.
5) Monetary policy indicator
In each country but Italy, the monetary policy indicator is the first difference of the 3 months interest
rate. In Italy, it is the first difference in the interest rate on repurchase agreements between the central
bank and credit institutions.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N. 011834
C) Model specification and estimation methods
For France, model (7) is directly estimated with four lags and contemporaneous macro variables.
Instruments are second and third lags of the 1st difference of log of loans, second lags of the
characteristics included in the equation: size and/or liquidity and/or capitalisation, and the monetary
policy indicator which is assumed exogenous. All these instruments are multiplied by time dummies
“à la Arellano-Bond”.
For Germany, all bank specific variables have been seasonally adjusted on a bank individual basis,
using a MA procedure. The first difference operator has been applied to model (7) before estimation.
The model has 4 lags. Instruments are the macro variables themselves, lags t-2 to t-5 of the 1st
difference of the log of loans, and lags 2 to 5 of all other (interaction) variables in the model. No
contemporaneous variables enter the models. Seasonal dummies and trend enter model (1).
For Italy, model (7) is directly estimated. Instruments are lags of the 1st difference of log of loans and
of the characteristics included in the equation. Inflation, GDP growth and the monetary policy
indicator are considered as exogenous variables. The model has 4 lags, and no contemporaneous
variables.
For Spain, the model is estimated in 4th differences of the 1st differences. This eliminates the seasonal
individual effects existing in the model in 1st differences. Estimation is done in a model with
contemporaneous values and 4 lags, with the GMM method proposed by Arellano and Bond, using as
instruments lags 5 through 8 of the 1st difference of loans and bank characteristics. Macroeconomic
variables are instrumented by themselves and their interactions with bank characteristics are
instrumented by the same macro variable interacted with the characteristic at time t-5.
For BankScope, model (7) is estimated with one lag of the endogenous variable, and either the
contemporaneous values or one lag (if contemporaneous values are not significant) for the other
explanatory variables. Estimation is performed in first differences. Instruments are the second and
consecutive lags of the 1st difference of log of loans, the bank characteristics and the interaction
terms.
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Table A3: Data description with respect to relative size* – December 1998
France Germany Italy Spain US
Small Large Total Small Large Total Small Large Total Small Large Total Small Large Total
Number of banks 249 16 332 2405 160 3207 578 36 759 182 12 243 8404 561 11206
Mean assets (billion of
euros)
0.770 92.33 6.398 0.161 24.49 1.591 0.138 28.90 1.863 0.498 43.67 3.612 0.045 4.82 0.32
Share of total assets 0.090 0.695 1 0.076 0.768 1 0.057 0.736 1 0.103 0.597 1 0.105 0.755 1
Mean deposits 0.492 44.89 3.393 0.123 7.311 0.628 0.070 9.705 0.646 0.292 18.70 1.773 0.039 3.44 0.24
Market share of total
deposits
0.109 0.638 1 0.147 0.581 1 0.083 0.713 1 0.123 0.521 1 0.12 0.72 1
Mean loans 0.343 37.91 2.576 0.095 7.673 0.588 0.055 12.31 0.762 0.246 17.65 1560 0.024 2.84 0.19
Market share of total loans 0.100 0.709 1 0.121 0.651 1 0.055 0.766 1 0.118 0.559 1 0.10 0.77 1
Liquid assets/total assets 0.416 0.294 0.401 0.176 0.175 0.173 0.421 0.257 0.399 0.424 0.337 0.407 0.44 0.36 0.37
Loans/total assets 0.411 0.358 0.403 0.580 0.394 0.563 0.387 0.405 0.388 0.450 0.466 0.459 0.53 0.59 0.58
Deposits/total assets 0.581 0.438 0.585 0.781 0.423 0.747 0.550 0.346 0.508 0.625 0.490 0.614 0.88 0.71 0.75
Capital and reserves/total
assets
0.106 0.037 0.089 0.059 0.041 0.055 0.122 0.068 0.112 0.154 0.049 0.132 0.10 0.07 0.08
* Source: Eurosystem data, Kashyap and Stein (2000). The datasets are corrected for “nonsense” observations, like banks with total assets smaller or equal to
zero. A “small” bank is situated below the third quartile of the distribution of total assets, while a “large” bank is situated above the 95th percentile. Data for the
US refer to 1993 and are expressed in billion US dollars. Liquid assets for the US are calculated as cash, securities and federal funds lent.
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Table A4: Data description with respect to absolute size* – December 1998
France Germany Italy Spain
Small Large Total Small Large Total Small Large Total Small Large Total
Number of banks 182 24 332 2710 64 3207 629 32 759 150 17 243
Mean assets (billion of euros) 0.313 66.741 6.398 0.228 53.250 1.591 0.187 31.557 1.863 0.255 34.154 3.612
Share of total assets 0.027 0.754 1 0.121 0.668 1 0.100 0.714 1 0.044 0.661 1
Mean deposits 0.182 33.000 3.393 0.169 14.361 0.628 0.089 10.444 0.646 0.164 15.095 1.773
Market share of total deposits 0.029 0.703 1 0.227 0.456 1 0.168 0.682 1 0.057 0.595 1
Mean loans 0.124 26.788 2.576 0.130 15.735 0.588 0.076 13.351 0.762 0.128 13.945 1560
Market share of total loans 0.026 0.752 1 0.186 0.534 1 0.112 0.739 1 0.051 0.625 1
Liquid assets/total assets 0.455 0.317 0.401 0.175 0.149 0.173 0.413 0.258 0.399 0.438 0.362 0.407
Loans/total assets 0.379 0.335 0.403 0.576 0.327 0.563 0.390 0.398 0.388 0.439 0.461 0.459
Deposits/total assets 0.549 0.491 0.585 0.773 0.287 0.747 0.538 0.334 0.508 0.639 0.514 0.614
Capital and reserves/total assets 0.123 0.034 0.089 0.057 0.036 0.055 0.120 0.065 0.112 0.172 0.054 0.132
* Source: Eurosystem data. The datasets are corrected for “nonsense” observations, like banks with total assets smaller or equal to zero. “Small” banks have
assets less than 1 billion euros, while “large” banks have assets more than 10 billion euros.
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Table A5: Data description with respect to liquidity* – December 1998
France Germany Italy Spain
High Low Total High Low Total High Low Total High Low Total
Number of banks 33 33 332 331 320 3207 91 72 759 24 24 243
Mean assets (billion of euros) 0.877 5.252 6.398 2.284 2.910 1.591 0.431 12.535 1.863 0.776 1.196 3.612
Share of total assets 0.014 0.082 1 0.148 0.183 1 0.028 0.638 1 0.022 0.034 1.000
Mean deposits 0.526 3.035 3.393 0.900 1.053 0.628 0.080 4.180 0.646 0.223 0.389 1.773
Market share of total deposits 0.015 0.089 1 0.148 0.167 1 0.015 0.614 1 0.013 0.023 1.000
Mean loans 0.062 3.086 2.576 0.643 1.104 0.588 0.062 5.556 0.762 0.053 0.645 1.560
Market share of total loans 0.002 0.119 1 0.113 0.187 1 0.010 0.692 1 0.004 0.043 1.000
Liquid assets/total assets 0.900 0.043 0.401 0.437 0.052 0.173 0.580 0.221 0.399 0.880 0.090 0.407
Loans/total assets 0.063 0.691 0.403 0.334 0.632 0.563 0.257 0.443 0.388 0.063 0.653 0.459
Deposits/total assets 0.630 0.522 0.585 0.616 0.63 0.747 0.555 0.322 0.508 0.387 0.367 0.614
Capital and reserves/total assets 0.092 0.072 0.089 0.081 0.061 0.055 0.155 0.086 0.112 0.337 0.164 0.132
* Source: Eurosystem data. The datasets are corrected for “nonsense” observations, like banks with total assets smaller or equal to zero. A bank with a low degree
of liquidity is situated below the 10th percentile of the distribution of liquidity ratios, while a bank with a high degree is situated above the 90th percentile.
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Table A6: Comparing the coverage of BankScope with the actual population in the Eurosystem
datasets (1998)
All All
Commercial Savings Cooperat./ Other Commercial Savings Cooperat./ Other
mutual mutual
number of banks BSc 146 40 72 22 12 96 39 15 7 35
Eurosystem 370 54 63 227 26 73 38 15 5 15
share (%) 39 74 114 10 46 132 103 100 140 233
average of total assets BSc 3013 5563 1582 3235 2689 22499 23119 7675 7120 31236
 (in mio euros) Eurosystem 1163 2081 2405 417 2760 8079 13010 2347 9535 830
ratio 2.6 2.7 0.7 7.8 1.0 2.8 1.8 3.3 0.7 37.6
median of total assets BSc 371 377 258 966 2943 663 858 517 829 410
 (in mio euros) Eurosystem 174 296 290 148 2079 614 883 539 491 303
ratio 2.1 1.3 0.9 6.5 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.4
number of banks BSc 16 8 1 1 6 456 223 24 94 115
Eurosystem 346 14 40 292 -- 1191 1053 32 101 4
share (%) 5 57 3 0 -- 38 21 75 93 2875
average of total assets BSc 14937 25955 2387 23332 939 9997 8487 6666 16359 8419
 (in mio euros) Eurosystem 311 5884 130 69 -- 2365 1565 7656 4962 79684
ratio 48.0 4.4 18.4 338.1 -- 4.2 5.4 0.9 3.3 0.1
median of total assets BSc 2199 13740 2387 23332 841 1180 700 5790 3301 573
 (in mio euros) Eurosystem 38 1187 50 35 -- 164 130 5663 2922 69372
ratio 57.9 11.6 47.7 666.6 -- 7.2 5.4 1.0 1.1 0.0
number of banks BSc 2021 211 581 1124 105 21 17 -- -- 4
Eurosystem 3246 331 594 2256 65 60 43 -- 12 5
share (%) 62 64 98 50 162 35 40 -- -- 80
average of total assets BSc 3413 10893 1860 644 26630 5468 6555 -- -- 653
 (in mio euros) Eurosystem 1583 4142 1533 230 35961 2198 2704 -- 29 3052
ratio 2.2 2.6 1.2 2.8 0.7 2.5 2.4 -- -- 0.2
median of total assets BSc 364 527 941 230 6237 1588 1945 -- -- 653
 (in mio euros) Eurosystem 182 395 951 114 20926 594 795 -- 12 1852
ratio 2.0 1.3 1.0 2.0 0.3 2.7 2.4 -- -- 0.4
number of banks BSc 47 27 3 1 16 576 93 63 377 43
Eurosystem 77 74 -- 3 -- 918 357 -- 561 --
share (%) 61 36 -- 33 -- 63 26 -- 67 --
average of total assets BSc 5421 7577 2946 847 2533 3657 11032 4111 677 13159
 (in mio euros) Eurosystem 3047 3041 -- 3202 -- 1671 4101 -- 124 --
ratio 1.8 2.5 -- 0.3 -- 2.2 2.7 -- 5.5 --
median of total assets BSc 2214 2146 2247 847 2084 216 1194 1376 117 1977
 (in mio euros) Eurosystem 1657 1575 -- 2258 -- 141 859 -- 76 --
ratio 1.3 1.4 -- 0.4 -- 1.5 1.4 -- 1.5 --
number of banks BSc 134 110 2 4 18 67 42 5 2 18
Eurosystem 209 -- -- -- -- 88 72 5 1 10
share (%) 64 -- -- -- -- 76 58 100 200 180
average of total assets BSc 3688 3592 13640 1852 3577 19568 17403 4246 97193 20249
 (in mio euros) Eurosystem 2588 -- -- -- -- 8140 7682 263 151915 999
ratio 1.4 -- -- -- -- 2.4 2.3 16.1 0.6 20.3
median of total assets BSc 782 825 13640 1472 602 2076 1374 741 97192 3366
 (in mio euros) Eurosystem -- -- -- -- -- 363 498 211 151915 174
ratio -- -- -- -- -- 5.7 2.8 3.5 0.6 19.3
number of banks BSc 43 29 3 1 10 159 85 50 12 12
Eurosystem 55 26 7 4 18 396 148 51 95 102
share (%) 78 112 43 25 56 40 57 98 13 12
average of total assets BSc 6669 6182 18719 2496 4883 8422 10324 6601 1775 9186
 (in mio euros) Eurosystem 5203 9986 861 2236 643 2283 3464 6217 332 419
ratio 1.3 0.6 21.7 1.1 7.6 3.7 3.0 1.1 5.3 21.9
median of total assets BSc 1670 1201 5470 2496 2559 1599 798 3488 1146 758
 (in mio euros) Eurosystem 385 2049 6 51 113 302 -- 3459 88 --
ratio 4.3 0.6 911.7 48.9 22.6 5.3 -- 1.0 13.0 --
Type
Belgium
France
Greece
SpainPortugal
Ireland
Type
Austria
Finland
Italy
Netherlands (1997)
Germany
Luxembourg
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Table A7a: Long-run coefficients estimated in model (7a), BankScope data: France
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
France
(BankScope data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
-0.335 -0.390 -0.198 -0.115 -0.315Monetary policy
0.217 0.116 0.486 0.620 0.148
-0.430 0.459 -0.138 0.159 -0.007Real GDP
0.591 0.349 0.791 0.759 0.990
-0.637 -0.092 0.915 0.250 -1.930Prices
0.728 0.943 0.529 0.886 0.209
0.174 -0.877 -2.542 0.011 0.060Char1*MP
0.266 0.606 0.378 0.949 0.725
0.530 1.465Char2*MP
0.752 0.381
-2.117Char3*MP
0.400
0.141Char1*Char2*MP
0.814
p-val Sargan 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
p-val MA1, MA2 0.000 0.741 0.001 0.316 0.000 0.658 0.001 0.741 0.001 0.768
No of banks, obs. 438 1554 419 1395 417 1482 379 1230 403 1323
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are standard errors.
Table A7b: Long-run coefficients estimated in model (7a), BankScope data: Germany
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
Germany
(BankScope data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
-2.008*** -1.063*** -0.806*** -1.412*** -1.615***Monetary policy
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.879*** 1.149*** 1.150*** 1.251*** 1.599***Real GDP
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.880** -0.659*** -0.428 0.195 0.549Prices
0.038 0.010 0.133 0.632 0.175
0.239** -7.254*** 2.312 0.027 -0.078Char1*MP
0.040 0.000 0.419 0.853 0.637
-4.122* -1.975Char2*MP
0.075 0.406
-2.707Char3*MP
0.167
-0.469** 2.236 2.778Char1*Real GDP
0.030 0.337 0.576
-0.417*** 2.138 2.214Char1*Prices
0.002 0.363 0.310
-4.001***Char1*Char2*MP
0.005
p-val Sargan 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
p-val MA1, MA2 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.804 0.000 0.372 0.000 0.580 0.000 0.504
No of banks, obs. 1578 5123 1509 4676 1555 5050 1421 4297 1472 4483
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are standard errors.
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Table A7c: Long-run coefficients estimated in model (7a), BankScope data: Italy
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
Italy
(BankScope data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
1.259*** -0.720 -0.205 0.064 0.241Monetary policy
0.008 0.692 0.567 0.951 0.909
-0.366 . 0.636 . .Real GDP
0.487 . 0.202 . .
-2.026*** 1.007 -2.310*** 1.813 3.662*Prices
0.000 0.279 0.000 0.106 0.055
0.133** -0.073 -8.954* 0.463* -0.660Char1*MP
0.032 0.996 0.061 0.097 0.330
-2.784 13.278Char2*MP
0.750 0.528
20.829Char3*MP
0.140
-12.850Char1*Char2*MP
0.196
p-val Sargan 0.537 1.000 0.995 1.000 1.000
p-val MA1, MA2 0.000 0.093 0.001 0.869 0.035 0.134 0.105 0.321 0.016 1.000
No of banks, obs. 463 1206 222 404 458 1178 200 347 215 381
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are standard errors.
Table A7d: Long-run coefficients estimated in model (7a), BankScope data: Spain
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
Spain
(BankScope data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
-0.430 -0.914*** -0.891 0.301 -0.253Monetary policy
0.237 0.005 0.112 0.607 0.463
-0.695 -0.732 -0.400 -1.035 -1.146*Real GDP
0.321 0.284 0.618 0.139 0.058
1.315 0.991 1.478 0.992 0.698Prices
0.258 0.487 0.232 0.424 0.552
-0.037 9.198*** -12.345 -0.165 -0.254*Char1*MP
0.803 0.004 0.106 0.361 0.099
5.619* 5.304**Char2*MP
0.088 0.038
15.414*Char3*MP
0.078
0.013Char1*Char2*MP
0.992
p-val Sargan 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
p-val MA1, MA2 0.000 0.812 0.000 0.434 0.003 0.554 0.000 0.423 0.000 0.333
No of banks, obs. 111 411 108 357 113 409 97 332 99 343
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are standard errors.
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Table A8a: Long-run coefficients estimated in models (2a), BankScope data
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
Euro area
(BankScope data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
0.210 -1.806 4.251 0.316** 0.320**Char1*MP
0.102 0.218 0.176 0.041 0.026
0.229 -0.025Char2*MP
0.904 0.990
3.165Char3*MP
0.404
-0.030Char1*Char2*MP
0.973
p-val Sargan 0.013 0.643 0.729 0.517 0.086
p-val MA1, MA2 0.000 0.219 0.000 0.339 0.000 0.967 0.000 0.811 0.000 0.644
No of banks, obs. 3029 9662 2637 7963 2990 9507 2474 7370 2579 7766
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are p-values.
Table A8b: Long-run coefficients estimated in models (2a), BankScope data
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
France
(BankScope data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
0.162 -0.158 -2.584 0.011 0.058Char1*MP
0.322 0.919 0.397 0.944 0.722
0.474 1.460Char2*MP
0.778 0.366
-1.960Char3*MP
0.439
0.137Char1*Char2*MP
0.811
p-val Sargan 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000
p-val MA1, MA2 0.000 0.585 0.000 0.646 0.000 0.765 0.001 0.879 0.002 0.810
No of banks, obs. 438 1554 419 1395 417 1482 379 1230 403 1323
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are p-values.
Table A8c: Long-run coefficients estimated in models (2a), BankScope data
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
Germany
(BankScope data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
0.231* -8.067*** 2.292 0.018 -0.078Char1*MP
0.060 0.000 0.420 0.904 0.637
-3.887* -1.991Char2*MP
0.093 0.408
-3.351Char3*MP
0.135
-0.478*** 4.201 2.762Char1*Real GDP
0.003 0.109 0.585
-0.393** 2.407 2.056Char1*Prices
0.020 0.400 0.346
-3.970***Char1*Char2*MP
0.009
p-val Sargan 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
p-val MA1, MA2 0.000 0.207 0.000 0.704 0.000 0.394 0.000 0.597 0.000 0.486
No of banks, obs. 1578 5123 1509 4676 1555 5050 1421 4297 1472 4483
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are p-values.
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Table A8d: Long-run coefficients estimated in models (2a), BankScope data
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
Italy
(BankScope data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
0.138* -0.073 -12.018* 0.463* -0.660Char1*MP
0.053 0.996 0.069 0.097 0.330
-2.784 13.278Char2*MP
0.750 0.528
20.829Char3*MP
0.140
-12.850Char1*Char2*MP
0.196
p-val Sargan 0.268 1.000 0.768 1.000 1.000
p-val MA1, MA2 0.060 0.819 0.001 0.869 0.890 0.999 0.105 0.321 0.016 1.000
No of banks, obs. 463 1206 222 404 458 1178 200 347 215 381
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are p-values.
Table A8e: Long-run coefficients estimated in models (2a), BankScope data
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
Spain
(BankScope data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
-0.080 9.020*** -12.209 -0.135 -0.176Char1*MP
0.430 0.004 0.113 0.372 0.214
3.538 4.378*Char2*MP
0.176 0.068
10.904Char3*MP
0.160
-0.559Char1*Char2*MP
0.604
p-val Sargan 0.999 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000
p-val MA1, MA2 0.014 0.354 0.000 0.393 0.003 0.565 0.000 0.318 0.000 0.238
No of banks, obs. 111 411 108 357 113 409 97 332 99 343
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are p-values.
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Table A9: Long-run coefficients estimated in models (7b), BankScope data
Size Liquidity Capitalisation
Monetary policy indicator
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Germany -2.485*** 0.000 -0.418 0.524 -1.924*** 0.000
Belgium -1.810 0.542 -1.813 0.450 -2.231 0.338
Spain 1.087 0.257 -1.922** 0.031 -0.582 0.508
Greece -2.873 0.240 -0.632 0.637 0.056 0.960
France -1.384 0.136 -6.330*** 0.000 -5.508*** 0.000
Ireland 5.712* 0.068 6.252* 0.053 4.047 0.131
Italy 2.440** 0.014 -49.602*** 0.004 -2.224*** 0.005
Luxembourg -10.477*** 0.003 -6.007 0.158 -7.623** 0.028
Netherlands 1.799 0.662 -2.064 0.497 -1.309 0.703
Austria 0.293 0.880 -0.299 0.910 -1.907 0.503
Portugal -1.874 0.809 . . -12.761** 0.026
Finland -8.436* 0.090 -11.279 0.163 2.116 0.788
Interaction term
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Germany 0.425*** 0.003 -1.918 0.355 6.202* 0.050
Belgium 0.895 0.293 -20.120 0.169 4.330 0.640
Spain -0.388 0.105 6.012 0.383 -8.747 0.612
Greece 0.211 0.793 2.086 0.743 122.465** 0.012
France 0.329 0.263 -17.696** 0.016 3.350 0.570
Ireland 1.793* 0.080 34.196 0.309 -13.329 0.594
Italy 0.443*** 0.008 38.711 0.522 -19.571** 0.011
Luxembourg 2.573 0.115 -12.442 0.411 24.682 0.544
Netherlands -0.109 0.932 37.199*** 0.007 3.400 0.976
Austria -2.072 0.159 -9.895 0.663 -42.923 0.568
Portugal 5.436 0.124 . . -141.506 0.278
Finland 3.872 0.143 -118.817** 0.047 86.156 0.459
*/**/** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N. 011844
Table A10a: Long-run coefficients estimated in models (8), national datasets
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
France
(Eurosystem data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
-0.394 5.247 7.768 -0.132 -0.408Char1*MP
0.556 5.348 16.517 0.233 0.262
8.211*** 7.303***Char2*MP
2.102 2.333
2.210Char3*MP
7.537
-0.304 -7.827 -19.96Char1*Real GDP
0.810 8.375 27.395
-0.055 -5.443 6.431Char1*Prices
0.719 7.196 24.818
0.121Char1*Char2*MP
1.445
p-val Sargan 0.107 0.214 0.124 0.376 0.082
p-val MA1, MA2 0.024 0.340 0.021 0.236 0.026 0.554 0.000 0.290 0.000 0.416
No of banks, obs. 312 5327 312 5327 312 5327 312 5327 312 5327
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are standard errors.
Table A10b: Long-run coefficients estimated in models (8), national datasets
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
Germany
(Eurosystem data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
-0.135 3.576*** 5.543 -0.048 -0.024Char1*MP
0.107 1.099 6.406 0.036 0.045
3.670*** 4.254***Char2*MP
0.878 0.876
3.305Char3*MP
5.258
0.183 -2.892** -0.410Char1*Real GDP
0.153 1.416 9.907
-0.451* 3.014 6.695Char1*Prices
0.237 2.440 14.270
-1.228**Char1*Char2*MP
0.548
p-val Sargan 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
p-val MA1, MA2 0.000 0.454 0.000 0.522 0.000 0.474 0.000 0.451 0.000 0.436
No of banks, obs. 2689 48402 2693 48474 2708 48744 2651 47718 2659 47862
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are standard errors.
Table A10c: Long-run coefficients estimated in models (8), national datasets
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
Italy
(Eurosystem data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
-0.034 1.320** 5.401** 0.014 -0.082Char1*MP
0.035 0.646 2.530 0.033 0.066
0.727* 0.732**Char2*MP
0.423 0.302
5.466Char3*MP
3.416
-0.873Char1*Char2*MP
0.661
p-val Sargan 0.091 0.079 0.171 0.179 0.086
p-val MA1, MA2 0.000 0.237 0.000 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.491
No of banks, obs. 587 25241 587 25241 587 25241 587 25241 587 25241
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are standard errors.
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Table A10d: Long-run coefficients estimated in models (8), national datasets
Models estimated with the following bank characteristic variables
Spain
(Eurosystem data)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation Size, Liq.
Capitalisation
Size
Liquidity
-0.255** 5.742*** 1.405 -0.203 -0.148Char1*MP
0.114 2.038 8.562 0.129 0.111
4.083** 5.342***Char2*MP
1.954 1.929
-10.904Char3*MP
9.057
1.932Char1*Char2*MP
1.181
p-val Sargan 0.966 0.969 0.991 1.000 1.000
p-val MA1, MA2 0.464 0.981 0.355 0.613 0.165 0.800 0.594 0.737 0.611 0.680
No of banks, obs. 210 4012 210 4012 210 4012 210 4012 210 4012
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are standard errors.
Table A11: Percentage change of loans following a one percent change in
interest rates, obtained from BankScope data
BankScope data France Germany Italy Spain
-0.391 -0.948*** -0.719 -1.157***Overall loan
response 0.116 0.001 0.686 0.001
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Numbers in italics are p-vlaues.
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